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The purpose of this article is twofold. First, it surveys Ireland’s European Union
referendum experience, tracing the key actors, issues and political dynamics of seven European
referendums from 1973 to 2008. It unpicks the institutional rules of the referendum game in
Ireland stemming from the McKenna and Coughlan judgements, the operation of the Referen-
dum Commission and the effect of this institutional environment on referendum campaigns and
outcomes. Second, building on a framework originally developed by Darcy and Laver (1990),
this article investigates the emergence of a dynamic in Irish referendums on EU treaties with




Until June 2001, Ireland’s experience of European Union (EU) referendums was a
positive one: referendums were comfortably carried, helping to copper-fasten




 EU member state. The
supportive attitude of the electorate in referendums on accession, the Single
European Act (SEA), Maastricht and Amsterdam treaties was mirrored by public
opinion polls on the EU: a healthy majority of those surveyed declared themselves in
favour of membership and appreciated the perceived benefits that membership
brought Ireland. The rejection of the Nice Treaty by the electorate in 2001 was there-
fore a major shock to the political elites, and for the first time indicated that perhaps
the Irish consensus on European matters could not be taken for granted. The success
of the second Nice referendum in 2002 appeared to suggest that lessons were taken
from the experience in 2001 and greater efforts were made to explain the relevant
issues to the electorate. However, the decisive defeat of the Lisbon Treaty in June





 With the second rejection of a European treaty by the Irish electorate
in seven years, Ireland’s EU referendum experience has been transformed.
The rejection of the Treaty of Lisbon in June 2008 marked a critical juncture in
Ireland’s relationship with the EU and at the same time brought two key issues sharply
into focus: the Irish electorate’s self-confessed lack of knowledge of the EU and
evolving Irish attitudes towards European integration. An environment has emerged
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Looking at the Nice I and Lisbon I referendums in particular, a dynamic has become
apparent with a number of common characteristics (Darcy & Laver, 1990; LeDuc,
2003; Moravcsik, 2008). As the experience of the French and Dutch referendums on
the European Constitutional Treaty in 2005 show, these referendum characteristics





 elite withdrawal from the referendum playing field, a number of effectively-
organized groups and political parties on the margins of the political system, often
espousing populist and anti-establishment ideas, succeeded in capturing the referen-
dum agenda. These actors capitalized on the fears and distrust of an electorate
deficient in general knowledge about the EU and were facilitated by the complexity




The purpose of this article is twofold. First, it offers a survey of Ireland’s EU
referendum experience, outlines why Irish governments hold referendums on EU
treaties, provides an account of how the rules of the Irish referendum game evolved,
and highlights the issues in each of the referendum campaigns. Second, it focuses
on a referendum dynamic that has emerged in the Nice I and Lisbon I referendums,
which involves the twin elements of elite withdrawal and populist capture. Implicit
in this analysis is an investigation into whether the Irish electorate is becoming
more Eurosceptic. In the Nice I referendum, it was evident that the success of the
No vote as a percentage of the electorate was heavily influenced by the abstention





 (see Figure 1). However, a key difference between the Nice I and Lisbon
Figure 1. Yes, No and abstentions as proportions of the electorate in EU referendums 
in Ireland.
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I referendums is the increase in No voters as a proportion of the total electorate
(from 18 percent at Nice I to 28 percent in June 2008). Although it was questionable
whether Nice I proved the Irish electorate was becoming more Eurosceptic




 public opinion polls have certainly
indicated that the Irish electorate is becoming increasingly cautious about European
integration: public opinion is nuanced. This has significant implications not only for
EU referendum campaigns in Ireland but, indeed, for the future course of Ireland’s
relationship with the EU.
 
Figure 1. Yes, No and abstentions as proportions of the electorate in EU referendums in Ireland.
 
Sourc : Available at, www.ir land.com/focus/ helisbontreaty/analys s/graphics/#result,accessed June 2008.
 
Dynamics of Referendums in Europe
 
There has been a substantial increase in the number of referendums held throughout
the world in recent years (LeDuc, 2003: 13; Qvortrup, 2005). Ireland is no exception
to this phenomenon, as Figure 2 shows. The majority of referendums in Ireland,
particularly since the 1960s, fall into one of two broad categories: those dealing with
social-moral issues and those dealing with governance issues, including referen-
dums on joining the European Economic Community (EEC) and subsequent EU
treaties (Sinnott, 2002: 812). Supporters of the referendum device have argued that
citizens’ direct involvement in politics, through referendums, can supplement
traditional forms of representative democracy (Qvortrup, 2005; Setälä, 2006). In an
era where the traditional forms of political participation, such as voting in elections
and membership of political parties, are seen to be in decline and trust in politicians
is on the wane, direct participation of citizens in the political process through
referendums can be seen to maximize legitimacy of decisions. They also have the
potential to increase actual participation and involvement of citizens in the political
process itself, engaging them as much as possible in the decision-making process
(LeDuc 2003: 38). In this sense, voting in referendums becomes an active form of
civic education (Barber, 1984; Qvortrup, 2005: 35).
 
Figure 2. Number of referendums in Ireland per decade.
 
Critics of the referendum device, however, focus on two general concerns. First,
referendums are seen as privileging the rights of the majority over those of minori-




European referendum results, 1972–2008
Date Issue % Yes % No % Turnout
% Spoilt or 
blank papers
10.5.72 Accession to EEC 83.1 16.9 70.9 0.8
26.5.87 Ratify Single European Act 69.9 30.1 44.1 0.5
18.6.92 Ratify Maastricht Treaty 69.1 30.9 57.3 0.5
22.5.98 Ratify Amsterdam Treaty 61.7 38.3 56.2 2.2
7.6.01 Ratify Nice Treaty (first time) 46.1 53.9 34.8 1.5
20.10.02 Ratify Nice Treaty (second time) 62.9 37.1 48.5 0.4




































‘routinely complain about insufficient information, confusing question wording, or
contradictory lines of argument regarding the possible consequences of a referen-
dum vote’ (LeDuc, 2003: 43). In addition, voter turnout in referendums is typically
lower than that in general elections (Butler & Ranney, 1994: 17). Indeed, Qvortrup
(1998: 256) has found that a frequent use of referendums generally results in a drop
in the turnout rate. The claims that referendums facilitate citizen participation in the
political process and increase civic education must be seriously evaluated in this
context.
Research on referendums, while limited in comparison to studies of voting behav-
iour in elections, has increased in recent years and focuses on why voters behave the
way they do in referendums (LeDuc, 2003: 14). As regards EU referendums, politi-
cal scientists are divided on the reasons why voters vote the way they do (Franklin,
van der Eijk & Marsh, 1995; Svensson, 2002; Binzer Hobolt, 2003). Some focus on
individuals’ values and beliefs, arguing that voting behaviour in EU referendums
reflects people’s underlying broad attitudes towards Europe: it is voters’ general
views on Europe that influence how they vote (Svensson, 2002). Others argue that
EU referendums work very much like second order European Parliament (EP)
elections; an important factor in determining their outcomes can be support for, or
opposition to, the party or parties in government at the time of the referendum
(Franklin, van der Eijk & Marsh, 1995).
Campaign dynamics have also been investigated (Darcy & Laver, 1990; LeDuc,
2002, 2003). Referendums are often seen to provide a very volatile electoral envi-
ronment, particularly in situations when political parties line up in a non-traditional
manner (i.e. not on ideological or partisan lines). In such situations voters find it
difficult to take cues or shortcuts from party positions, take more time to come to a
decision, and that decision becomes highly unpredictable (LeDuc, 2003: 173;
LeDuc, 2002: 727). In this context, the nature of the campaign becomes extremely
important and the impact of opposition campaign strategies and tactics can play a
crucial role in determining the outcome. While LeDuc acknowledges that the politi-
cal context of each referendum can differ widely, a referendum dynamic, or at least
a set of common patterns, can emerge (LeDuc, 2003: 15). In the face of broad
consensus across the political spectrum, establishment elites often withdraw from
the campaign arena, leaving the referendum field open to capture by what Darcy
and Laver (1990) term ‘fringe activists’, frequently espousing populist or anti-
establishment values. In the context of elite withdrawal from EU referendums in
particular, the often emotive tactics of such groups – capitalizing on voter igno-
rance, the complexity of the issues and an underlying sense of political discontent
amongst the electorate – can wrestle control of the referendum campaign from those
who originally instigated it in the first place (Moravcsik, 2008). According to Darcy
and Laver (1990: 16), ‘as the going gets rough on one side, the elites withdraw, the
spiral begins, the going gets rougher, and so on. Once the elites begin to back off,
the voters too, become dubious and vote no’. As we will see in this survey of
Ireland’s EU referendum experience, such a referendum dynamic exists in Ireland,




































EU Referendums in Ireland
 
The reason behind the 1972 referendum on accession to the EEC was fairly straight-
forward: it was necessary in order to correct the conflict that the obligations of





obligations of EEC membership and alongside the doctrine of supremacy of Euro-
pean law, legislative authority would no longer be solely invested in the Oireachtas
and the European Court of Justice would be superior to the state’s Supreme Court.
Rather than amending each of the affected articles accordingly, the decision was
taken to introduce a catch-all amendment (Article 29.4.3) allowing the state to join
the EEC. The 1972 referendum has been the only time Irish political parties have
divided on a European issue according to the (rather weak) left–right economic cleav-
age evident in Irish electoral politics (Sinnott, 2002; Gallagher, 2003): the parties of
the centre-right/right (Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael), alongside business leaders and
farmers’ groups, strongly advocated membership of the Common Market, while
parties of the left (primarily the Irish Labour Party and the Workers Party), alongside
the civil society group the Common Market Study Group and the Irish Congress of
Trade Unions, campaigned for a No vote. The mounting of a vigorous campaign by
political parties and civil society groups which were clearly divided on the issue,
together with wide public discussion of the issues, helped push turnout up (at 70.88
percent it is the highest level of turnout heretofore recorded in any referendum in
Ireland) and the referendum was comfortably carried with 83.1 percent in favour.
By the time of the signature of the Single European Act (SEA) in 1986, the
consensus amongst political and legal circles was that parliamentary approval was




































sufficient in order for Ireland to ratify the new treaty. After a period of delay, the
SEA was put before the Dáil on 9 December 1986. However, concern in certain
legal and academic circles as to the means used to ratify the SEA was growing and
just before Christmas 1986, development economist and anti-EEC campaigner
Raymond Crotty, backed by a larger group, challenged the constitutionality of the
bill in the courts (McCutcheon, 1991). Crotty and fellow campaigner Anthony
Coughlan believed that the SEA went far beyond what the Irish people consented to
when they originally approved membership of the EEC in 1972 (Crotty, 1988: 104).
On appeal to the Supreme Court in early 1987, Crotty succeeded in stopping the
Oireachtas from ratifying the SEA. Basing its judgments on the provisions in Title III
of the SEA entitled ‘European Political Cooperation’, by a three-to-two majority the
Supreme Court held that Title III was inconsistent with the Constitution as it was
additional to the original constitutional sanction provided by the 1972 referendum
and thus the Constitution required amendment if the SEA was to be ratified. The
government moved quickly to approve legislation which would enable the Constitu-
tion to be amended, setting the stage for another EU-related referendum in 1987. As
in 1972, the decision was taken to confine the 1987 referendum to the specific issue
at hand, namely the amendment of the constitution in order to ratify the SEA, rather
than introducing an all-encompassing amendment that would make all future refer-
endums unnecessary. This political decision has meant that since 1987, ratification
of European integration treaties in Ireland has been carried out by referendum.
 
The Rules of the Irish Referendum Game
 
The rules of the Irish referendum game were decided in the 1990s and stem directly
from two court judgments referred to as the McKenna and Coughlan judgments
respectively. During the 1992 Maastricht campaign the government came under fire
from treaty opponents for the use of public funding in order to campaign for a Yes
vote. Feeling hampered by their limited financial resources, especially in compari-
son with the resources held by the Yes side, anti-Maastricht groups criticized the
decision by the state broadcaster Raidió Teilifís Éireann (RTÉ) to show a special
government television appeal for a Yes vote without allowing equal airtime to the
opposition campaign. In the run up to the 1995 divorce referendum, then Green
Party Member of European Parliament (MEP) Patricia McKenna questioned the
constitutionality of the use of public money by the government to campaign for a
Yes vote. Such funding was declared unconstitutional as the Supreme Court ruled
that the government was not entitled to use public money to put forward only one
side of the case, since not all citizens would support one side. Thus, for each refer-
endum since 1995, the government of the day has established a Referendum
Commission whose function is to inform the public about the issues and arguments
in a non-biased manner. The Commission is composed of non-political figures, and
usually headed by either a former or current member of the judiciary nominated by
the Chief Justice, alongside the Ombudsman, the Comptroller and Auditor General
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1998, in response to a request for judicial review by Anthony Coughlan, the High
Court found that RTÉ’s giving of airtime on the basis of electoral support for politi-
cal parties resulted in inequality amounting to unconstitutional unfairness ‘which
would not have arisen had their starting point been to afford equality to each side of
the argument to which there could only be a YES and NO answer’ (Carney, 1998).
The implication of this judgment (confirmed by the Supreme Court in January 2000)
has been that in subsequent referendums, RTÉ has allotted equal broadcast airtime
(i.e. on television or radio) to parties and groups advocating a Yes and No respec-
tively, in any given campaign. Taken together, both judgments considerably altered




The SEA, the Treaty on European Union and Amsterdam Referendums
 
Between 1972 and 2008, Irish governments fought seven referendum campaigns
asking the Irish electorate to ratify five EU treaties and a number of common char-
acteristics in each of these referendum campaigns emerged. Turnout in EU referen-
dums have typically been lower than at general elections, reaching a lowest point in
June 2001 when 34.9 percent of the electorate turned out to vote on the Nice Treaty.
Apart from the 1972 accession referendum, EU treaties have garnered broad support
across the political establishment, including the mainstream political parties, trade
unions and business organizations. Smaller political parties, ostensibly at the
margins of the political spectrum, such as Sinn Féin, the Green Party and the Social-
ist Workers’ Party and non-party political and civil society groups all have opposed
EU referendums (this changed in 2008 when the Greens, now a partner in the Fianna
Fáil-led government, did not campaign against the Lisbon Treaty).
Until Nice I, Irish governments and other pro-European campaigners were
convincingly able to point to the benefits EU membership had brought Ireland, both
in terms of direct financial transfers and in increased opportunities for Irish industry
and workers. In alluding directly to this ‘donor/recipient’ narrative, they relied on
the permissive consensus inherent in Irish public opinion on the EU, namely that
citizens appreciated the considerable benefits Ireland had received from EU
membership. Little effort was made to explain the issues at stake to the electorate.
Political parties tended not to campaign actively in referendums.
The Single European Act referendum campaign is a case in point and set the tone
for referendum campaigns to follow. While the Workers’ Party and Sinn Féin
campaigned for a No vote (the Labour Party did not adopt an official position due to
internal differences), the main opposition came from groupings outside the party
political system, including veteran anti-EU campaigner Anthony Coughlan. Those
campaigning for a Yes vote argued that Ireland’s membership of the European
Community would be at stake and that damage would be done to the economy and
employment if the referendum was defeated. Little effort was made to inform voters




































was comfortably carried with an almost 70 percent Yes vote. The fall in turnout to 44
percent was more alarming however, and constituted at the time the second lowest
ever turnout in a referendum (Gallagher, 1988: 80). The effect of the low turnout was
that the Yes vote amounted to only 30.7 percent of the electorate, compared with 58.4
percent in 1972.
In some ways, the Maastricht referendum of 1992 could be said to have been
merely a re-run of the SEA referendum. The referendum was comfortably carried
(with 69.1 percent voting Yes) and the pro-European consensus amongst mainstream
political parties and interest groups such as the trade unions was solidified as both the
Labour Party and the Irish Congress of Trade Unions (ICTU) came out in favour, thus
marking the first time that Labour had given official support to an initiative towards
integration. What is notable about the Maastricht referendum campaign is not just the
solidifying of a pro-European consensus amongst political parties (with the exception
of the Green Party and Sinn Féin), but also the rise in importance of civil society
groupings in the referendum campaign. In the Maastricht campaign, these groups
included Anthony Coughlan’s National Platform for Employment, Democracy and
Neutrality (comprising other groups such as the People First/Meitheal organization
and Irish Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, CND). Neutrality, sovereignty and
independence, and the threat integration posed to traditional, Catholic values were
recurring motifs of the debate. The threat of possible conscription to a common
European army was also mooted. The focus of the campaign was also deflected away
from the content of the treaty itself towards issues such as the record financial sum
negotiated by the then Taoiseach Albert Reynolds as part of the Delors II structural
fund package and the controversial rulings on abortion by the High Court and
Supreme Court in the ‘X’ case, which led to discussions on the treaty becoming
embroiled in the issue of the introduction of abortion in Ireland.
The party-political pro-European consensus continued in the 1998 Amsterdam
referendum as the leaders of the government coalition parties, Fianna Fáil and the
Progressive Democrats, joined forces with Fine Gael, Labour and Democratic Left
to host a press conference in which they jointly urged a Yes vote based on the
economic and political benefits active EU membership would bring. A core tenet of
their argument was that rejecting the treaty would hurt Ireland’s position in the EU.
Much of the debate during the campaign focused on the issue of neutrality with
protagonists in favour of the treaty asserting that the treaty had no negative implica-
tions for neutrality. The Peace and Neutrality Alliance (PANA) chaired by Roger
Cole opposed the treaty on the grounds of the threat it posed to Irish neutrality and
much of the discussion during the campaign focused on Ireland’s participation in the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) Partnership for Peace framework.
While the referendum was comfortably carried with a 61.7 percent Yes vote, the
No vote of just over 38 percent was the largest vote against EU integration hitherto
recorded. With a turnout of 56.2 percent, the proportion of the electorate rejecting
further integration reached a high of 21 percent, with 45 percent of the electorate
choosing to abstain (see Figure 1). The Amsterdam referendum was the first EU
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Referendum Commission’s approach of making a public call for arguments from
individuals, interest groups or parties, and then putting these together in leaflets,
newspaper advertisements, and television and radio broadcasts was widely criti-
cized, leading as it did to erroneous arguments being presented as facts. The material
disseminated by the Commission was also criticized by some as turgid and confus-
ing, turning off voters rather than enlightening them (Mansergh, 1999; Gallagher,
2003). The ineffectiveness of the Commission in informing voters of the issues at
stake was highlighted even more when the results of an exit poll were published in
May 1998. Asked ‘why did you vote No against the Amsterdam Treaty’, those
polled cited a perceived lack of information as the main reason (Gilland, 1999: 435).
 
The Nice and Lisbon Referendums
 
The Nice I and Lisbon I referendums provide the most illuminating examples of
Ireland’s EU referendum dynamic, clearly illustrating the two characteristics of elite
withdrawal and populist capture. At Nice I, the broad consensus across the political
establishment in favour of ratification was again in evidence. The smaller parties of
Sinn Féin, the Green Party and the Socialist Workers’ party all campaigned against
the treaty. The Nice Treaty was sold by Yes campaigners as being in Ireland’s best
interests, as it would facilitate the enlargement of the EU from 15 to 25 and thereby
give Irish industry access to an enlarged single market. The referendum also took
place on the same day as two other referendums on the International Criminal Court
and the death penalty. With their eye on a general election in 2002, political parties
advocating a Yes vote were reluctant to spend money campaigning and the message
put forward to the voters was unclear. In contrast, No campaigners, including
Anthony Coughlan’s National Platform, the ‘No to Nice’ group (led by anti-
abortion campaigner Justin Barrett), PANA and others ran a highly committed and
visible campaign. Their main slogan ‘if you don’t know, vote No’, echoed that of
the Amsterdam referendum.
In the second Nice referendum in 2002, those advocating a Yes vote did not this
time withdraw from the campaign arena. While the same No campaigners emerged
to advocate another No vote, a re-engaged political elite was joined by a number
of strongly committed civil society groups organized under the umbrella ‘Irish
Alliance for Europe’. Before the campaign proper began, the government moved
to allay electorate fears, securing two declarations on Irish neutrality at the June
2002 Seville European Council summit. A National Forum on Europe was set up
to communicate the issues to a wider public in advance of the second referendum,
and national parliamentary scrutiny on EU matters was enhanced. With Minister
for European Affairs Dick Roche taking the lead, government ministers and
opposition politicians spoke to the issues within the treaty and firmly rebutted No
campaigners’ claims. Increased face-to-face political campaigning also took place
which reduced room for No campaigns to instil fear in the electorate. On 18





































The referendum dynamic of elite withdrawal was even more in evidence in the
first Lisbon referendum of June 2008. For those advocating a Yes vote, selling
Lisbon was always going to be difficult. Unlike the single European market under-
lying the SEA or the common currency underlying the Maastricht Treaty, the Treaty
of Lisbon contains no one ‘grand’ idea (Moravcsik, 2008). As an amending treaty, it
sets out various incremental reforms to EU decision-making and policy-making
procedures. It is arguable that, as the only member state to ratify the treaty by
referendum, the Irish government was faced with an unenviable task. Early signs
that ratification would be a challenge were also evident in public opinion polls. In a
poll conducted in November 2007, only 25 percent of those surveyed said they
would vote Yes to the new Treaty, while 13 percent intended to vote No and 62




The retreat of the political elite from the Lisbon campaign could be said to be a
mixture of both accident and design. It became clear from early 2008 that the then
Taoiseach Bertie Ahern was distracted from the business of government due to ongo-
ing revelations at a judicial enquiry into planning matters. Amidst growing public
disquiet, Ahern’s position came under scrutiny. Confusion also existed as to when the
referendum itself would be held as Ahern procrastinated in naming a date, eventually
deciding on a date in June (Laffan & O’Mahony, 2008: 116). Between the announce-
ment on 2 April 2008 of Ahern’s intention to resign and the appointment of Brian
Cowen as Taoiseach on 8 May 2008, a political vacuum emerged which was filled
by effectively organized No campaigners. Passing Lisbon was the new Taoiseach’s
first priority but the campaign itself was set to be a short one of barely four weeks
and, as new Minister for Foreign Affairs Micheál Martin was to subsequently





Treaty had the support of all main political parties, including the parliamentary Green
Party. Sinn Féin was the only party in the Dáil to campaign against Lisbon.
The Yes campaign only ignited one week before the referendum date itself, when
a TNS/MRBI poll clearly indicated that the referendum could be lost. In terms of
campaign strategies and tactics, the Yes campaigners failed to construct a narrative
on the treaty, simply urging voters to trust them and vote Yes. Yes posters
expounded generic slogans such as ‘Good for Ireland, Good for Europe’, ‘Europe,
Let’s be at the Heart of It’ and controversially displayed photos of politicians, which
were more akin to election campaign posters. Admissions by a number of politicians
such as new Taoiseach Brian Cowen and European Commissioner Charlie
McCreevy that they had not read the treaty in its entirety did not help the Yes
campaign. Given the early foothold gained by the No campaign, the Yes side spent
their time attempting to counter No arguments and misinformation. Infighting
amongst the mainstream political parties (most notably Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael)
also undermined the Yes campaign, as did the threat by sectional interests such as
the farmers’ organizations, most notably the Irish Farmers’ Association (IFA), to
withhold their support for the treaty unless a commitment was given by the govern-
ment to veto ongoing World Trade Organization (WTO) talks should the ultimate







































. (2008: 5–11) have found that an important feature of Irish politics is
the personal and local style of campaigning in general elections which consists of
extensive door-to-door campaigning by party workers and the candidates themselves,
the distribution of leaflets, putting up posters and canvassing at shopping centres,
church gates, etc. Such campaigning has not been as common in referendums: ‘tradi-





reports circulated that there was very limited door-to-door campaigning undertaken
by the Yes side in the Lisbon referendum. In a parliamentary committee debate in the
immediate aftermath of the referendum result, one politician referred directly to this:
‘Nobody knocked on doors. People felt a massive deficit in engagement … People




 In contrast, the National
Forum on Europe road shows that took place around the country in the lead-up to and
during the campaign appeared not to have had an impact on public knowledge and
engagement as public attendance was low. According to Marian Harkin MEP: ‘we






Low Levels of EU Knowledge
 
Research has shown that since the 1990s at least, knowledge of the EU amongst the
Irish public is low (Laffan & O’Mahony, 2008: 128). In his 1995 study, Sinnott
discovered that the positive perceptions of EU membership in Ireland were accom-
panied by relatively low levels of knowledge regarding the EU (Sinnott, 1995).
Ireland ranked sixth overall out of all then 15 EU member states in actual levels of
knowledge of how the EU functioned. In addition, Sinnott found a positive correla-
tion between higher levels of knowledge of European affairs and a favourable
attitude to European integration. Low levels of knowledge are also closely associ-
ated with social class and level of education. At the time of Lisbon I in 2008, it
became clear that both the Irish electorate’s objective (i.e. actual) and subjective
(i.e. perceived) knowledge of the EU continued to be poor (Laffan & O’Mahony,




 69 (Spring 2008), three questions were fielded to




 In the survey Ireland was
compared with Denmark: 29 percent of Irish respondents answered three questions
correctly (compared with 40 percent of Danes); 28 percent of Irish respondents
answered two questions correctly; 22 percent answered one question correctly and
22 percent gave no correct answer to the questions (in comparison with 10 percent
of Danes).
In terms of knowledge of the Lisbon Treaty itself, a Referendum Commission
opinion poll in late April 2008 found that just five percent of those polled believed
they understood the treaty well or quite well (see Quinlan, 2009). A total of 15
percent understood it to some extent while 80 percent said they did not understand it
particularly well or did not understand it at all (Referendum Commission, 2008). In




































Department of Foreign Affairs, the main reason behind abstention was lack of
knowledge/understanding of the treaty (at 46 percent this was well in excess of any
other reason). In terms of an understanding of the treaty at the time of the referen-
dum, the researchers found: 
1. 9 percent had a good understanding of what the treaty was about;
2. 31 percent understood some of the issues but not all;
3. 30 percent was only vaguely aware of the issues involved;
4. 30 percent did not know what the treaty was about at all.
Of those surveyed who said they voted Yes, 70 percent said that they either had a
good understanding of the treaty or some understanding of the issues. In contrast, of
those who said they voted No, 53 percent said they were either only vaguely aware
of the issues or had no knowledge. As the Millward Brown/IMS report (2008)
concluded: ‘an EU knowledge deficit is clearly present which has undoubtedly
contributed to the No vote [in Lisbon] … Knowledge of EU institutions and how
they work appears to be particularly low. The difficulty of advocating a referendum
that is based on the premise of institutional reform in this environment is apparent’.
A common strategy of referendum opponents is to sow seeds of doubt about the
motives of those proposing the referendum and possible unforeseen consequences
of a positive referendum outcome. As analysts such as LeDuc (2003: 71) have
observed, ‘when voters become suspicious or uncertain, they tend to vote No’. In
the context of the knowledge deficit amongst the Irish electorate as outlined above,
the strategy of Lisbon No campaigners was to cherry-pick elements of the treaty and
attack them, instilling fear into the minds of an electorate already displaying worries





, 2008). In this way, voters did not have the
knowledge to hand to be able to properly scrutinize the various statements regarding
the treaty put forward by the No campaigners (Moravcsik, 2008). Through the
McKenna and Coughlan judgments, these fringe activists, often espousing populist
sentiments, gained an important foothold in the media and succeeded in capturing
the Lisbon campaign.
 
Populism and the No Campaigns
 
The populism of Irish No campaigners was most clearly evident in the Lisbon I refer-
endum campaign. As a concept, populism is notoriously difficult to define. Accord-
ing to Canovan (1999: 3), populism in modern democratic societies is best seen as an
appeal ‘to the people’ against both the established structure of power and the domi-





, rather than what they are for (Mudde, 2004: 546). At its heart
however, populism involves opposition between the ‘people’ and the ‘elite’. In an
era of declining participation in political parties, falling voter turnout and low levels
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accountability to the people, far removed from the ‘common’ person (Abts &
Rummens, 2007: 408). Populism can attach itself to many different ideologies and
any economic programme, therefore populists can be found in any position on the
left–right political spectrum. Populism is not confined to grass-roots movements led
by charismatic leaders, members of the political establishment can also adopt ‘popu-
list’ tactics with the use of simple, direct language that appeals directly to the people.
At first glance, the rise of populism in Western Europe has been a phenomenon
that has taken place outside of Ireland, with the use of referendums on moral, social
and European issues helping to insulate Irish electoral politics from it (Albertazzi &
McDonnell, 2008: 2). However, that does not mean that populism does not exist in
Ireland. Indeed, as an example, Fianna Fáil politicians in particular have adopted
populist rhetoric in the past (the famous reference to Fianna Fáil as a movement rather
than a political party for instance). Sinn Féin politicians also make use of populist
rhetoric, particularly in relation to the EU (cf. McDonnell, 2008; O’Malley, 2008). In
the Lisbon I campaign, populist sentiment became increasingly evident amongst
opponents of the treaty, from both the left and the right. On the left was the Campaign
Against the EU Constitution (CAEUC), a broad coalition of leftwing political parties,
organizations, trade unionists and individuals who opposed the Lisbon Treaty.
Couching their rhetoric in anti-establishment terms, these groups opposed the treaty
on a number of fronts: it posed a threat to Irish sovereignty and independence (partic-
ularly in foreign policy terms as an attack on Irish neutrality), it undermined workers’
rights, it would usher in the privatization of public services, and Ireland’s right to levy
taxes would be circumscribed. Finally, the treaty was presented as an ‘anti-demo-
cratic constitutional treaty … foisted upon the peoples of Europe by anti-democratic
methods’ (Campaign Against EU Constitution, 2008). Anthony Coughlan’s National
Platform also campaigned against Lisbon on the basis that it undermined Irish
sovereignty and the principle of the equality of states in the EU.
As in the Netherlands, elements of the religious right have also opposed EU refer-
endums in Ireland on the grounds that ratification of EU Treaties constitutes a threat
to Irish Catholic values, by undermining the importance of family values, facilitat-
ing the introduction of abortion and challenging the right to life. During the Nice I
and II referendum campaigns, the No to Nice group, led by longstanding conserva-
tive campaigner Justin Barrett, himself a former leader of Youth Defence,
campaigned against the Nice Treaty on this and other issues. In 2008, Youth




 (Justice) and opposed the Treaty of Lisbon on similar





the Charter of Fundamental Rights would force Ireland to legalize abortion, gay




 also tapped into the ‘anti-establishment,




 7 June 2008)
through their use of poster slogans such as ‘Don’t be Bullied, Vote No’.
In opposing the Lisbon Treaty, Declan Ganley and his small but tightly organized
Libertas movement also made most use of populist rhetoric, combining anti-estab-
lishment sentiment with economic neo-liberalism and an emphasis on the benefits




































Constitutional Treaty, which he called an ‘attack on democracy in Europe and a
subversion of Europe’s citizenry’ (Ganley, 2003: 3). For Ganley, the Constitutional
Treaty represented the ‘political bureaucracy’s attempt to consolidate its hold over
the decision-making process in the EU’. The crux of Libertas’ campaign against the




 a European constitution. Libertas
undoubtedly ran a masterful and highly effective campaign, with sophisticated use
of the internet amongst other media. Ganley welcomed the referendum result with
rhetoric that exemplified his style throughout the campaign: 
This is democracy in action. It makes me proud to be Irish … The Irish sent a
message to an unelected, unaccountable elite in Brussels that they need to listen
to the will of the people … today is about the common sense and generosity of
the Irish people in handing Europe back to the people it belongs to … A chasm





, 13 June 2008)
In late 2008, Ganley launched Libertas as a pan-European political party, contesting
the 2009 European Parliament elections throughout Europe. Only French politician
Philippe de Villiers was elected under the Libertas banner, Ganley himself failing to
win a seat in Ireland’s North West Constituency. Very late in the day Declan Ganley
decided to re-enter the fray and oppose the Lisbon Treaty referendum again. The igno-
minious results for the party were closely followed by Ganley’s announcement that he





, 9 June 2009), a position he retracted just a few weeks prior to the Lisbon II vote.
Populist and anti-establishment argumentation in an EU referendum campaign is
not unique to Ireland and the range of objections raised to EU treaties in Irish refer-
endums have been echoed elsewhere. In the French referendum on the Constitutional
Treaty in 2005, the No campaign brought together a ‘fairly heterogeneous collection
of minor fringe and/or radical anti-system parties placed disparately on the tradi-
tional left-right axis’, from Philippe De Villiers (later of Libertas) and his far right,
Eurosceptic 
 
Mouvement pour la France,
 
 to the Communist Revolutionary League




 (Ivaldi, 2006: 55). These left-wing
groups argued that the Constitutional Treaty promoted an Anglo-Saxon vision of a
liberal free market Europe (Marthaler, 2005: 230). In the Dutch referendum of 2005,
a similar range of groups from both left and right campaigned against the treaty.
According to Harmsen (2005: 6), these groups consisted of three main strands: the
populist left (such as the Socialist Party), the populist right (including the Pim Fortyn
List and the Geert Wilders group) and small, traditional Protestant parties, who were




The shift in the No vote at Lisbon by 10 percent to 28 percent of the electorate
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Euroscepticism can be viewed in a broad manner, either as an outright rejection of
the EU and the process of European integration (so-called hard or principled Euros-
cepticism), or as opposition towards particular policy areas or developments (soft or
contingent Euroscepticism) (Szczerbiak & Taggart, 2008; Sorensen, 2008: 6). In
investigating Euroscepticism in Ireland it is also important to make the distinction
between party Euroscepticism and scepticism amongst the electorate (Sczcerbiak &
Taggart, 2000). Over time, the Green Party and Sinn Féin have provided the most
audible voices critical to the EU amongst Irish political parties, falling into the ‘soft’
Eurosceptic camp in their opposition to aspects of EU integration (Gilland, 2008).
Both parties have shifted over time, however, leading to the conclusion that their
opposition to aspects of the EU is perhaps conditional. The transformation in the
Green Party stance on the European Union since it entered government does suggest
that small party opposition to the EU may be contingent (Laffan & O’Mahony, 2008).
Following a poor general election campaign in 2007, Sinn Féin used the Lisbon I
referendum to enhance the profile and positioning of the party in the Republic. The
profile of the party may have benefited, but their electoral fortunes did not. The party
returned only its MEP from Northern Ireland (Bairbre de Brún) to the European
Parliament in 2009 after Mary Lou McDonald failed to regain her seat (in the Dublin
constituency whose seat total had been reduced from four to three).
There remains widespread support for European integration amongst Irish people.
Since the early 1980s, support for the EU rose from lower levels of support to very
high levels, well above the EU average (Laffan & O’Mahony, 2008: 123). However,





, 2008). Faced in 2004 with a hypothetical situa-
tion whereby the EU would be scrapped (the dissolution question), 54 percent of
Irish respondents said they would be sorry, whereas 43 percent felt they would be
either indifferent or did not know what to think – thus giving the impression that
enthusiasm for the EU does not run all that deeply. Irish enthusiasm for certain
aspects of integration, such as further political integration, is also more measured
(Laffan & O’Mahony, 2008). For example, while attitudes to security and defence
matters in general are more likely to be positive than negative, a large percentage of
Irish people are unsure about these issues (as evidenced by the numbers of respon-





published in the aftermath of the Lisbon I referendum, ‘there is also evidence of a
recent small but significant shift towards a preference for more national decision-
making and away from EU decision-making on a range of issues, especially issues





2008: 15). In addition, identification with Europe is low amongst Irish citizens. In
the 2008 poll, 46 percent of those surveyed said they had little or no sense of attach-
ment to the EU and 59 percent ‘rejected the proffered degrees of European identity
and opted for an exclusive Irish identity, second in frequency in this respect only to




, 2008: 21). While on their own such findings
do not point directly to rising Euroscepticism amongst the Irish electorate, they do






































In the second half of 2008, the use of the referendum device in ratifying EU treaties
was seriously questioned as a solution to Ireland’s ‘Lisbon dilemma’. Indeed, the
scope of the Crotty judgment and the possibility of parliamentary scrutiny of the
Lisbon Treaty or aspects of the Lisbon Treaty were widely discussed (e.g. Barrett,
2008; Barrington, 2008; Cox, 2008; Fanning, 2008). The conduct of the referendum
game in Ireland was also questioned, most particularly the role of the Referendum
Commission. Based on overwhelming precedent, however, it has become embedded
in Irish political culture that EU treaties are ratified by referendum and in December
2008 it became clear that the Lisbon Treaty would be put to the Irish electorate for a
second time under the existing referendum rules (LeDuc, 2003: 186; Cox, 2008). As
Minister for European Affairs, Dick Roche acknowledged, the challenge for the
Fianna Fáil-Green coalition government in the Lisbon II referendum in this context
involved constructing: ‘a narrative for Europe that speaks to peoples’ hearts, as well
as to their pocketbooks’ (Roche, 2008). The changed economic situation facing the
country, the emergence of new, active campaign groups (both for and against) and
the re-invigoration of existing pro-European civil society groups also meant that the
2009 referendum campaign on the Lisbon Treaty would be somewhat different to
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1. The second referendum on the Lisbon Treaty took place on 2 October 2009. The referendum was
passed by 67.1% to 32.9% on a turnout of approximately 58% (source: RTÉ).
2. Darcy and Laver (1990: 16) based their analysis in part on the 1986 divorce referendum in Ireland
and proposed that elite withdrawal in referendum campaigns consists of ‘elite retreat brought about
by community conflict’ when the elite either loses or cedes control of the referendum campaign to ad
hoc groups. While in the 1986 referendum campaign non-government political parties such as Fianna
Fáil pledged neutrality on the issue and as such did not actively campaign in the Nice I and Lisbon I
referendums, the political parties which did come out in favour of the treaty ran weak campaigns. I
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6. John Perry TD, speaking at the Joint Committee on European Scrutiny - Joint Committee on
European Affairs Lisbon discussion, 3 July 2008.
7. Marian Harkin, Independent MEP, speaking at the Joint Committee on European Scrutiny – Joint
Committee on European Affairs Lisbon discussion, 3 July 2008.
8. Individuals surveyed were asked first about the number of states currently in the EU, second whether




































also asked about the number of Eurozone countries. This question was excluded from the analysis as
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